Probing into the sufferings of Singapore's left-wing labour movement in the 1960s [Part 2]
Written by Chng Min Oh @ Zhuang Ming Hu
Translated by Ang Pei Shan, Choo Shinn Chien, Choo Shinn Chei, Choo Weng Liang
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| [Picture left] Chng Min Oh @ Zhuang Ming Hu, the author |
| [Picture right] Lee Siew Choh, Chairman of BSS |
| ▲ [Picture above] Lee Siew Choh’s return to Barisan Sosialis Singapura (BSS) was warmly welcomed by the party on 7 March 1965. In 1966, directions were given to the party MPs to comply with the party policy. A banner unfurled on the street reads: "Parliamentary Democracy is dead!" Standing behind the banner (from the left) were Koo Young, Ong Lian Teng, Tan Cheng Tong, Chia Thye Poh and Poh Ber Liak. Since then, BSS had embarked on “the road of no return”. They gave up parliamentary struggle and abandoned lawful organisations. |
| No wonder Lee Kuan Yew wrote in his memoirs "Lee Siew Choh had not only rendered the communist united front ineffective, he had in effect surrendered the constitutional arena to the PAP. It was a costly mistake, one that gave the PAP unchallenged dominance of Parliament for the next 30 years.” (see Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew, 2000, p 129) |
Chng was arrested under the "Internal Security Act (ISA)" on 3 August 1970 for his active involvement in the left-wing trade union movement. He was stripped of his citizenship rights and was imprisoned without trial for thirteen years and four days. He was released on 7 August 1983 with four conditions imposed upon him:
- Not allowed to leave the country without permission
- Not allowed to move house without permission
- Not allowed to contact former political detainees
- Not allowed to participate in pro-communist political activities
In Chng's later life, he continues to participate in some civil society activities. In view of the PAP government Singapore is still implementing draconian laws which contradict with the proclamation of democracy and human rights in this era, on 19 September 2011, together with fifteen former ISA detainees, Chng signed a petition for the abolishment of ISA. In 2013, Chng specially wrote an article entitled "The Common Voice of the Victims: Immediately Repeal ISA" for the 50th Anniversary of the "February 2 Incident", and also delivered a speech in the commemoration event held at Hong Lim Park, Singapore on the same day (2 February).
The 83-year-old author has never given up his concern for human rights and democratic movement in Malaysia and Singapore. In order to share his views and discourse with readers who do not understand Chinese, Chng specifically arranged a friend of his to translate Part 1 of his article to English, the main text had been sent to Sahabat Rakyat Working Committee and is published on Sahabat Rakyat blog – this has added sparkle to the 17th anniversary (2001-2018) commemoration event of Sahabat Rakyat.
The author highlights the suppression of Singapore's left-wing trade union movement in the 1960s', first by the British colonial government and subsequently, by Singapore's ruling party, the People's Action Party (PAP) led by the then Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, as well as by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the then Prime Minister of Malaysia, leader of Malaysia's UMNO (United Malay National Organisation) ruling clique. The repression was particularly harsh during the ‘Operation Coldstore' before the formation of the Federation of Malaysia. Moreover, the sabotage within the left, mainly caused by politicians with wild ambition and undercovers of enemies infiltrated into the left-wing camp had resulted in the eventual demise of the left-wing trade union movement in Singapore, nearly half a century by now.
The author wishes to convey the main messages below in his article:
- We must learn from this bitter history so that we do not repeat our mistakes; may we be reminded that no commemoration event or political movement is to be alienated from the realities and from the people, demands put forward should meet the aspirations and the interests of the broad masses.
- We must learn from this bitter history that the reform movement at any period of time will not only suffer the suppression of the enemy externally but also the sabotage of the enemy internally which both should not be neglected.
Followings are the 6 outlines of Part 2 of Chng's article:
Due to unforeseen circumstances, the author was unable to present the English rendition of Part 2 as scheduled. Hence this English rendition of Part 2 was translated by personnel delegated by the Secretariat of Sahabat Rakyat and published on 9 Sep 2019 as a gift of our 18th anniversary (2001-2019).
The publication of the English rendition of Chng's article at this time may provide some readers (especially those who do not understand Chinese and do not understand the history of Malaysia/Malaya and Singapore) a historical lesson, or a new revelation, when they ponder about the question about the restoration of Mahathirism encountered by the democratic reform movement in Malaysia at present phase.
Below is the full text of Part 2 of Chng's article, the illustrations are added by the editor.
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Towards the end of last year (2012), I presented a paper on the occasion of commemorating the 50th anniversary of the "February 2 Incident". It was upon the invitation of editorial committee of the souvenir bulletin for the occasion.
Early January this year (2013), unfortunately, the souvenir bulletin could not be published as planned. As an alternative, with the consent of the Editorial Committee of the souvenir bulletin, I sent the article to the Secretariat of Sahabat Rakyat, Johor Bahru for publication. (sahabatrakyatmy.blogspot.com).
The article was well received by the Secretariat of Sahabat Rakyat Working Committee. It was posted on their blog on 12 January, before the day of commemorating the 50th anniversary of the "February 2 Incident". The Editor of Sahabat Rakyat added an excellent explanatory note to the article. In addition, 11 precious historical pictures were inserted as impressive illustrations for the article.
On the following day (13 January), the Singapore Insight website (sginsight.com) that I often visited, also posted my article together with the Editor's Note of Sahabat Rakyat Working Committee. My article went viral and my views as expressed in the article were widely disseminated.
A large number of old friends of mine paid me visits. They discussed the article with me. They provided me with comments through phone calls, or personally shared their views with me. It was indeed a great encouragement to me. It boosted my spirits.
I encountered some difficulties too. I had been ostracised, vilified or attacked by certain individuals. One or two of them had hidden agendas. They openly insinuated that I was a "problem individual". They even went to the extent of trying to prevent me from delivering a speech on the occasion of commemorating the 50th anniversary of the "February 2 Incident". My speech had in fact been submitted to the Organising Committee for vetting in advance.
It was entitled "The voice of ISA victims: Abolish ISA now". Some speakers were in favour of "democratic reform". Consciously or unconsciously they put on an air of hegemony in an attempt to brush off my article. I paid no heed to what they did. I was quite confident that historical facts would prevail. No rhetoric or distortion could ever change the actual course of history!
Upon the invitation of the Editorial Committee of the souvenir bulletin, I wrote the paper on the "February 2 Incident" The original draft was a lengthy one, consisting of more than 70,000 words.
Topics covered included: the Operation Coldstore; crackdowns launched by the reactionary regimes both in Singapore and Malaya on the left-wing labour movement; damage done to the left-wing movement as a result of erroneous moves by Lee Siew Choh and leaders of BSS under his control; and the incidents of arrests and detentions of the left-wing trade unionists headed by Lim Chin Siong, who also happened to be the leaders of the left-wing political movement.
Certain all along influential leading organisations and leaders of the left-wing movement, but long divorced from the broad masses, had made some incorrect decisions and policies about the constitutional struggle and the united front of the left-wing movement. Such errors had resulted in the ultimate collapse of the Singapore left-wing workers' movement as well as the left-wing political movement well developed since the 1960s. Up to these days, such unfortunate historical events have yet to be reviewed.
I have re-written the first half of my original article, reducing it to around 20,000 words. It touches on the situation before and after the "February 2 Incident", and the causes of the schism in the left-wing movement.
I submitted it to the Editorial Committee of the souvenir bulletin. A copy was sent to Sahabat Rakyat Working Committee. For some reasons, there was a delay in the publication of the souvenir bulletin. But it was posted on Sahabat Rakyat Working Committee blog before the date of publication. (sahabatrakyatmy.blogspot.com/2013/01/115_12.html)
Appended below is the second half of my article I decided to put on hold. It is the supplement and arguments in support of the points raised in the first half of the article. It may be regarded as a continuation of the previous article "Probing into the sufferings of Singapore's left-wing labour movement in the 1960s."
1. As an important component part of the Singapore left-wing labour movement, the leadership of SCHFEU (Singapore Commercial House & Factory Employees' Union) urged the left-wing political parties and organisations to present their views on the topic of "The Unity of the People and Unity of the Left".
Lee Siew Choh and 7 others returned to the party fold in March 1965, posturing as victors. Since then, the diverse views within the Singapore left-wing movement fast developed into a serious schism.
The Singapore Commercial House & Factory Employees' Union (SCHFEU), one of the leading organisations within the left-wing labour movement, expressed the following views on the possible consequences:
| (1) | The serious schism was a problem that could not be overlooked. If it turned from bad to worse, it would have an adverse impact on the life and death of the left-wing labour movement as well as the left-wing political movement; |
| (2) | There were diverse opinions on the issue of whether to persist in or to abandon the three guiding principles laid down by Lim Chin Siong. Such core issue must be resolved at once, only then could the diversity of opinions and the schism be fully understood. |
| (3) | Cadres and the masses must understand the nature of the differences in opinion. They should also be encouraged to resort to collective wisdom in search of an appropriate solution to the problem. |
In view of the above, the then leaders of the SCHFEU (1965-1966) [Note 1] carried out the following important tasks:
1. In July 1965, the Central Committee of the SCHFEU adopted a resolution in their annual programme: "To achieve overall national unity; To achieve militant unity of left-wing; To strengthen internal unity of our union; To launch political and ideological education."
Since 8 August 1965, political forums had been organised at SCHFEU headquarters almost monthly. Four leaders of the left-wing parties, were invited to give talks on the topic of "National Unity and Left-Wing Unity". Cadres and members were invited to attend. The 4 leaders were:
| (1) | Wee Lee Fong, Secretary-General of the Labour Party of Malaya; |
| (2) | Kow Kee Seng, member of the Central Committee of BSS and Members of Parliament (MP) of Paya Lebar Constituency; |
| (3) | Lee Siew Choh, Chairman of BSS; and |
| (4) | Tay Check Yaw, Vice Chairman of Partai Rakyat. |
The topics covered by the four speakers were:
| (1) | "Left-wing Unity and National Unity" by Wee Lee Fong; |
| (2) | "The political situation prevailing after the exit of Singapore from Malaysia; understanding the various contradictions; and uniting the people for the struggle" by Kow Kee Seng; |
| (3) | "Left-wing Unity and the United Front" by Lee Siew Choh; |
| (4) | "Left-wing Unity and the Current Urgent Task" by Tay Check Yaw. |
Their speeches were published in full in the SCHFEU Bulletin [Note 2] for public consumption.
2. The SCHFEU Bulletin published articles of the SCHFEU in conjunction with the organisation of political talks. Those articles interpret and analyse the three guiding principles proposed by Lim Chin Siong. The intention was firstly, to provide an opportunity for the cadres and the masses to study the political strategy adopted by Lim Chin Siong and exchange ideas on it. Secondly, the cadres and broad masses could make comparisons between both the principles put forward by Lim Chin Siong and the views expressed by the four political party leaders, with a view to arriving at a general consensus.
On 17 September 1965, the SCHFEU Bulletin carried an article "The Objective Reality and Analysis by Comrade Lim Chin Siong". It reflected our understanding of the 3 guiding principles and their application and practice at the stage of campaigning against Malaysia as well as the anti-colonial, national, and democratic political struggles. Appended below are some excerpts from the article:
On the issue of "constitutional struggle by peaceful means", the article states:
"In the entire process of conducting the referendum by the ruling elite since the introduction of the Singapore National Referendum Act, up to the ultimate vote-counting exercise, the ruling elite adopted extremely undemocratic practices. At the final stage of the campaign for casting blank vote, the bourgeoisie chose to compromise, and some political parties vacillated.
Consequently, some segment of the people ran out of patience. They lacked a comprehensive and correct understanding and appraisal of the nature of peaceful constitutional struggle, as well as that of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie.
The three guiding principles proposed by Lim Chin Siong, not only overcame such lopsided understanding of the nature and role of the constitutional struggle, but also that of the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. His profound strategic thinking was of great significance in guiding the struggle against the forced implementation of the Merger Plan for Malaysia."
"Comrade Lim had made a comprehensive appraisal of the issue of 'peaceful constitutional struggle'. He pointed out the possibility on the part of the reactionary forces to do away with the constitutional struggle by peaceful means. But he did not totally deny the role played by the constitutional struggle at the present stage.
Comrade Lim's incisive insight into this issue was not only about having a comprehensive appraisal of the above two aspects, but also to appropriately resolve the relationship of the left-wing forces on the issue of persisting in constitutional struggle vis-a-vis the ultimate denial of the constitutional struggle by the reactionary forces."
"In a nutshell, Comrade Lim had expressed the following views:
- Garnering the support of the majority of the people was the basis for ensuring victory of the left-wing movement;
- The constitutional struggle still played an important role in enlisting the support of the majority of the people;
- Since the left-wing movement was able to win popular support by constitutional means, the reactionary forces would surely attempt to obstruct by all means the path towards democracy, to the extent of resorting to violence, totally frustrating the constitutional struggle by peaceful means."
Comrade Lim had a profound insight into the problems of the constitutional struggle by peaceful means'. If one fails to or reluctant to understand this, one then fails to understand the profound significance of the expression used by Comrade Lim, namely, "so long as the favourable conditions for the peaceful constitutional struggle still exist, we must adhere to the constitutional struggle by peaceful means."
About the words "uniting the vast majority of the people", the article states:
Worker-peasant Unity forms the basis for uniting the vast majority of the people. Only when there is a solid foundation will the grand national unity become firm and long-lasting. The stronger the unity, the longer will it last. Eventually the left-wing forces will emerge stronger. The stronger the left-wing forces become, so will the unity of workers and peasants be reinforced.
For uniting the vast majority of the people, Comrade Lim remained steadfast in the stand and principles based on the unity of workers and peasants. It showed his deep understanding of the issue. No only solving the issue of uniting the majority, he also solved the issue of how to unite most of the people."
With a view to "strengthening national unity", the article points out:
"As for the principle and policy of "strengthening national unity", we only need to point out the fact that, after the formation of Malaysia, ethnic conflicts had occurred twice, one after another. It goes to show the profound significance of the guiding principles of struggle propounded by Comrade Lim."
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| [Picture above] A caricature by an anonymous artist. It appeared in the souvenir issue of Bulletin in commemoration of the 1968 International Labour Day. The journal was published by the Singapore Gold and Silver Smiths' Union (SGSSU). |
| The witty and vivid caricature was widely circulated within the leftist circle. There was a strong reaction from among BSS cadres and party members. It also stirred up controversy among them. The caricature ridiculed Lee Siew Choh for his extremist line of struggle. It depicted what he had done to the party. |
| But the caricature did not in any way touch on the great harm done by him to the entire left-wing movement, especially the Singapore labour movement. In any event, it vividly depicted the typical behaviour of Lee Siew Choh after re-joining the party in 1965. His harmful conduct left an indelible impression on the people at large. |
The left-wing anti-colonial movement adopted a democratic approach in solving internal disputes. Full discussions were allowed. Differences were tolerated. Free expression of diverse opinions was permitted. In the end, the majority view would prevail over the minority view.
The majority view would be put into practice, while the minority view was given due respect, and reservation of diverse views was allowed. The majority view would be verified by practice as to its correctness subsequently. Final conclusion would then be drawn. The principle of "democratic centralism" was held in high esteem, as it was regarded as the fine tradition of the left-wing anti-colonial movement.
The principle and fine tradition would be adhered to when mobilising the cadres and the masses, in order to give full play to their collective wisdom. We worked in all sincerity with a view to eliminating internal schism. Unity would be forged ultimately in the fight against the enemy.
In the meanwhile, the Barisan Sosialis Singapura (BSS) leaders headed by Lee Siew Choh engaged in activities of "completely wiping out the leading role played by the trade unions." They involved themselves mainly in the following activities:
- In May 1966, Lee Siew Choh publicly vilified and labelled the SCHFEU and other major trade union leaders as being "pseudo-left" or "enemy agents". He tried to find fault with the resolution adopted by the trade unions in a general assembly held in celebration of the Labour Day. Individuals and political parties or organisations toeing his line, were persuaded by him to malign trade union leaders who happened to hold different views.
- During the election of the Central Committee of SCHFEU in May, certain opportunists who worked undercover in the SCHFEU, with the support of the some leaders of BSS headed by Lee Siew Choh, resorted to the devious means of "changing the ballot box " (stealthily replacing the genuine ballot box with a fake one) with a view to seizing the control of the SCHFEU.
Such unbelievable incident would for certain remain in the memory of those in the know. This was an attempt on the part of Lee Siew Choh and his cohorts to deal heavy blows to the left-wing labour movement, and to cause a split within the movement. His motive was to compel the trade unions to toe his erroneous line of struggle.
Lee Siew Choh and the leaders of BSS at his behest, arbitrarily pursued the line of struggle they believed to be the only correct one. They totally ignored the strategy of "seeking accord while containing differences" as advocated by the left-wing labour movement at that time. They adopted a hostile attitude towards the trade unionists and sought to remove them, since the trade unions were reluctant to toe their line.
The erroneous decisions made at the connivance or acquiescence on the part of the hitherto influential leaders of the left-wing movement, lurked both at home and abroad, contributed to such poor state of affairs.
Under such circumstances, SCHFEU, the largest trade union in Singapore at that time, was unable to put into practice its proposals for "achieving unity of the left-wing movement" and "to set aside all differences in a concerted effort to fight against the enemy". SCHFEU strongly advocated the autonomy of the labour movement in taking the initiative. They persisted in the line of struggle proposed by Lim Chin Siong.
SCHFEU failed to attract the attention and gain the recognition of the lurking all along influential leading organisation or leaders of the left-wing movement. But SCHFEU’s persistent efforts left an indelible mark in the history of the left-wing labour movement as well as the left-wing political movement in Singapore.
2. Lee Siew Choh gave up parliamentary struggle and abandoned the lawful means of struggle, resulting in the rapid decimation of the left-wing labour movement and the left-wing political movement in Singapore.
Before World War II, Malaya (including Singapore) was a British colony. To suppress the popular struggle for self-government and independence, the British colonialists promulgated the Emergency in 1948. They imposed military rule in Malaya, causing much bloodshed. The anti-colonial forces in the country were forced to wage an armed struggle under the leadership of the Communist Party of Malaya（CPM).
The unfolding of the armed struggle of the people expedited the development of the anti-colonial movement in the country. It struck at the very foundation of the British colonial rule. The British colonialists realised that the military rule alone could hardly put out the resistance of the enraged population. On the contrary, it constituted an extremely heavy financial burden on the British colonial administration.
In 1954, to ameliorate the popular anti-British sentiment, the people of Malaya were allowed to carry out the "constitutional struggle by peaceful means" and to "form self-government". Hence, the emergence of the "constitutional struggle by peaceful means" in this country.
To the people of this country, the emergence of the constitutional struggle would entail a transition from the brutality of war to an environment conducive to peaceful struggle. This was certainly welcomed by the broad masses of the war-wearied people. They longed for peace.
"Parliamentary democracy" was something new to the populace after all. The progressives in our anti-colonial movement were aware that it was a scam set by the ruling elite, but the vast majority of the people still harboured illusions about it, and had yet to fully realise its deceptive nature.
Numerous progressives in the anti-colonial movement seized the opportunity to abandon their underground activities, and to involve themselves in the open and lawful struggle. They chose to sink or swim with the people. They were at the forefront of the constitutional struggle by peaceful means. They would have the masses involved and tampered in the course of the constitutional struggle by peaceful means, with a view to finding the right way to deal effective and heavy blows to the reactionary ruling elite.
The British colonial government introduced the "Rendel Constitution" in 1954. It allowed the people of Singapore to have self-government through parliamentary election. The British colonial government enacted legislation to impose restrictions on freedom of association, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of publication, etc.
The progressives involved in the anti-colonial movement opted for the open and legal struggle. A large number of organisations and associations were formed by students, workers, farmers, alumni and cultural activists. They sprang up like mushrooms. Various types of publications were produced.
The constitutional struggle by peaceful means provided the workers with an opportunity to organise trade unions, and to elect their own representatives to look after their interests. Workers could carry out struggles against oppression and exploitation. They fought for their economic rights. The emergence of trade unions enabled them to organise and carry out education programmes for the public at large; to raise the political awareness of the workers; and to forge unity among the workers in the struggle for political reform.
A preliminary study gave a figure of about 120,000 industrial workers in Singapore at that time. About 87,000 of them were members of 157 trade unions. The fastest growing trade union was SFSWU (Singapore Factory and Shop Workers` Union).
SFSWU was founded in 1954. About a year later, Lim Chin Siong became its secretary of general affairs in March 1955. Its total membership then was only 1,354. But half a year later, the membership increased by leaps and bounds, reaching the height of 27,000, an increase of nearly 20 times in October 1955.
SFSWU, under the brilliant leadership of Lim Chin Siong and his comrades Lim Chin Seng@Lim Chin Kok and Yong Koh Kim, had also the support of the left-wing trade unions in other varied industries. It emerged as the leading trade union in the labour movement in Singapore. (See article "Singapore People`s Anti- British League (SPABL) – an Exploratory Study" 《星洲人民抗英同盟会历史初探》 by Zhong Hua (锺华) in the book 《砥柱止中流》[di-zhu-zhi-zhong-liu, Hong Kong Footprint Press] p. 19).
The labour movement headed by Lim Chin Siong was not only committed to economic struggle for the well-being of the workers, but it was also actively involved in the political struggle for democratic rights. They attached great importance not only to "lawful organisations" formed by workers, farmers, students, etc., but also to "organising democratic parties, striving for constitutional reform", "participating in parliamentary elections, and striving to be the masters of the country."
Lim Chin Siong and his comrades-in-arms subsequently participated in the activities of the PAP (People's Action Party). Lim Chin Siong, Lee Kuan Yew and four other individuals were appointed as candidates for the Party in the Singapore Legislative Assembly General Election, held in April 1955. Three of them, including Lim Chin Siong and Lee Kuan Yew, were elected to the legislative assembly. Lee Kuan Yew knew in his heart of hearts, that they were elected with the full support of the left-wing labour movement as well as the student movement.
For 8 long years from April 1955 till 1963, the left-wing political parties prided themselves on representing the interests of the vast majority of the populace. They had participated in three parliamentary elections in Singapore, namely, the 1957 City Council Election, the 1959 as well as the 1963 Legislative Assembly General Elections.
It would appear that the 1957 Election was merely a "rehearsal" by the British colonial masters in their attempt to substitute their agents in Singapore. They decided to give Lim Yew Hock and his cohorts the boot. At the same time, they welcomed Lee Kuan Yew and his followers in replacement. The subsequent 1959 General Election was to be regarded as their "real performance" in earnest.
In order to gauge public opinion, and to pick their agents for running the colonial administration, the British colonial masters put up the facades of "fair competition" and "democratic elections" in conducting the general elections held in 1957 and 1959. The PAP projected itself as a "left-wing political party. It seized the opportunity to emerge as the victor in the "fair and democratic" elections.
But the subsequent 1963 election was quite different. It was a parliamentary election conducted by the concerted efforts of the British colonial masters and both the puppet governments of Malaysia and Singapore. It was to create a new form of colonial rule, known as the "Federation of Malaysia". It was designed to prolong the British colonial domination in the territories of Malay Peninsula, Singapore and the North Borneo (Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei).
To implement the Malaysia Plan, they resorted to large-scale suppression of the leftists in Singapore. More than 100 leaders wielding great influence among the left-wing organisations, were arrested and detained. The election was then held. It was the dirtiest and most shameless, unfair and undemocratic parliamentary election ever held in Singapore.
After the so-called "fair and democratic parliamentary election", the people of Singapore had a basic understanding of the deceptive nature of the Western democracy of "parliamentary elections". They also acquired a certain degree of experience of the peaceful constitutional struggle allowed by the British colonialists.
But the political awareness of the masses had yet to be raised to a higher level, so that they would harbour no illusions about "parliamentary elections" or "peaceful constitutional struggles". Those who had a basic understanding and experience of the deceptive nature of the "parliamentary democracy" as well as the complexity of the constitutional struggle, might not necessarily support or participate in any struggle other than the peaceful constitutional struggle.
The same was true of the left-wing cadres and the masses. After the "February 2" mass arrests, a number of leftist cadres and masses, under the threat of white terror, shied away from the left-wing movement. Right after the defeat of BSS in the 1963 General Election (Note: Only 13 seats were won out of 51 seats), numerous cadres and people had some doubts about the future of the left-wing movement. They chose to leave or keep their distance from the movement.
Before and after the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, the reactionary cliques of the British, Malaysia and Singapore chose not to wipe out the left-wing forces completely. They were slow to proscribe all the left-wing organisations as had been done by them during the Emergency promulgated in 1948. Instead, they arrested and detained leftist leaders and closed down left-wing organisations from time to time.
At the same time, the reactionaries resorted to legal proceedings against the remnants of the left-wing leaders. They invoked several pieces of legislation, including the Trade Unions Amendment Act [Note 3], the Societies Amendment Act, the Industrial Relations Amendment Act, and the Employment Act [Note 4] to clamp down on the leftists, with a view to threatening their survival and constraining their development. It went to show that the reactionaries were against closing down completely the path of constitutional struggle for the time being. But they would not hesitate to resort to violent suppression.
The above portrays the distinct feature of the political situation prevailing after the "February 2 Incident" mentioned in my previous article (Part 1).
After the 1963 General Election, SATU (Singapore Association of Trade Unions) was of the view that "after the state election and the general strike, the reactionaries did not completely block the path of struggle. Therefore, we still have to continue adopting the constitutional approach in the future when dealing with the reactionaries." That was a far-sighted decision, entirely in line with the actual situation obtaining in Singapore at the time. It was also in line with the will and aspirations of the people from all walks of life.
➀ Lee Siew Choh and BSS leaders led by him could not wait to instruct the cadres and masses to abandon the "constitutional struggle and the "lawful organisations" after their defeat in the 1963 general election.
The left-wing forces encountered setbacks in the 1963 General Election. Lee Siew Choh eventually woke up from his pipe dream of forming a shadow cabinet. He came to the following conclusions:
| (1) | The reactionaries would certainly practise deception in the parliamentary election, in order to secure their victory, and to ensure the defeat of the left; |
| (2) | The left-wing forces stood no chance of achieving genuine success in the parliamentary election manipulated by the reactionaries; |
| (3) | The broad masses had an important political lesson. Their political awareness was much improved; |
| (4) | The leftists should discard their illusions about "parliamentary democracy" and "parliamentary elections". |
Lee Siew Choh assumed that the masses shared his views. He would not hesitate to act fast. He began to entertain the idea of giving up "constitutional struggle" and "parliamentary elections".
In August 1965, Singapore was expelled from the Federation of Malaysia by the UMNO ruling clique. Soon, in December 1965, PAP announced that the "Singapore Legislative Assembly" was to be renamed as the "Singapore Parliament". The two major national events affecting the interests of the populace took place without any debate in "Parliament". The deal was just sealed in an arbitrary manner by the PAP ruling party. "Parliament" obviously was an instrument of the ruling elite for suppressing the people of Singapore.
Members of Parliament from the BSS boycotted parliamentary sessions as a gesture of protest against the undemocratic and deceptive nature of"Parliament". It was also a form of protest against the ruling elite for brushing aside the aspirations of the people.
About one year later, on 8 October 1966, the leaders of BSS led by Lee Siew Choh advised their 9 MPs to resign en bloc from Parliament, with a view to intensifying the struggle to expose the deceptive nature of "parliamentary democracy". The 9 MPs were: (1) Chia Thye Poh of Jurong constituency, (2) Koo Young of Thomson constituency, (3) Ong Lian Teng of Bukit Panjang, (4) Poh Soon Leck @ Poh Ber Liak of Tampines, (5) Tan Cheng Tong of Jalan Kayu, (6) Lee Tee Tong of Bukit Timah, (7) Loh Miaw Gong of Havelock, (8) Chan Sun Wing of Yishun, and (9) Wong Soon Fong of Toa Payoh.
Both Lee Tee Tong and Loh Miaw Gong were arbitrarily detained for a long period of time since their winning of the parliamentary seats. Chan Sun Wing and Wong Soon Fong were subsequently compelled to go underground after they managed to escape from the police dragnet.
Looking back, it is most heart-breaking to see that all MPs of BSS embarked on a road of no return. They tendered resignation from Parliament, and chose to go on the street, participating in a protest march, displaying the banner "Parliamentary democracy is dead". Such move indicated that BSS headed by Lee Siew Choh was encouraging their cadres and masses to give up "parliamentary struggle" and to abandon all "lawful organisations".
In May 1966, Lee Siew Choh convinced some opportunists in SCHFEU to topple by devious means the leaders like Chen Sin (Chen Xin@Tan Seng Hin) who strongly believed in the correctness of Lim Chin Siong's line of struggle.
Lee Siew Choh's faction went all out to pursue the line of struggle termed "extra-parliamentary mass struggle". Though they made no mention of giving up "constitutional struggle", the cadres and the public at large were well aware that the "extra-parliamentary mass struggle", was merely a euphemism for "unconstitutional struggle" or even armed struggle.
This was evidenced by a speech made by Lee Siew Choh at the grand celebration of the Labour Day organised by BSS in 1968. He said:
"If we were to say that we are moving towards armed struggle," "…our enemy will seize the opportunity as an excuse to carry out suppression…"
(See 阵线报, the BSS newspaper, 279th issue)
Apart from abandoning "parliamentary struggle" and "lawful organisations", they attempted to persuade some other political parties from pursuing the similar line of struggle. A year after the en bloc resignation of all BSS MPs, Lee Siew Choh's faction targeted at the Labour Party of Malaya (LPM) in its attempt to change LPM's line of struggle.
An editorial entitled "Carry on the extra-parliamentary mass struggle to a new height" appeared in 阵线报 (Zhen Xian Bao ) of 8 October 1967. It clearly expressed the view of opposing the political line of "parliamentary struggle cum mass struggle" advocated by the Central Committee of the Labour Party of Malaya（LPM).
A new LPM Central Committee comprised both the Central Secretariat members and some Central Committee members, was formed. That happened after the resignation of 5 key Central Committee members of LPM (namely, Wee Lee Fong, Lim Kean Siew, Tan Chee Khoon, Ng Ann Teck and V David). The en bloc resignation of the 5 Central Committee members was accepted by Extraordinary National Congress held by the LPM on 24 September 1966.
The editorial quoted Mao ZeDong's reference to the "violent action", indicating impliedly that the "extra-parliamentary mass struggle" Lee Siew Choh upheld, was the only "correct line of struggle". Excerpts from the editorial are quoted below:
"The so-called "parliamentary struggle" was discredited by the people of Malaya. The "parliamentary struggle cum mass struggle" advocated by a handful of the Central Committee members of the Labour Party of Malaya was similarly an incorrect line of struggle. Such slogan was meant to cover up their belief in capitulationism in the form of "parliamentary cretinism" and right opportunism. They were in reality opposed to "extra-parliamentary mass struggle."
"We resolutely oppose the incorrect policy of "parliamentary struggle cum mass struggle". We must publicise, defend and put into practice the anti-imperialist mass struggle, as Chairman Mao put it: "Revolution is a violent action of overthrowing one class by another …"
The irresponsible comments made by BSS headed by Lee Siew Choh were ignored by the Central Committee of LPM supported by the majority of its state divisions and party branches. LPM persisted in their line of struggle, namely, the strategy of engaging in "parliamentary struggle cum mass struggle; mass struggle supplemented by parliamentary struggle".
LPM showed much concern for issues such as: the livelihood of the people; and the mass struggles in various forms adopted pursuant to their line of struggle. The most popular form of mass struggle was the popular nationwide demonstrations that occurred in the month of November 1967, in protest against the depreciation of the Malaysian currency.
Almost in every State, banners and slogans were found everywhere, flyers distributed; street rallies and public assemblies as well as other mass activities were held. People from all walks of life in Penang participated in the hartal against the depreciation of currency. This was one of the most outstanding mass activities.
Unlike the LPM leaders, though labelled as "right opportunists", BSS leaders headed by Lee Siew Choh, failed to mobilize the populace to protest against the depreciation of currency. Such failure revealed their failings. They had alienated themselves from the masses.
➁ 12 party branches of BSS presented a joint petition for an in-depth discussion of "intra-party democracy", aimed at preventing Lee Siew Choh from abandoning "parliamentary struggle" and "lawful organisations".
Not long after the return of Lee Siew Choh to the party fold, and before gaining full control of the party, information was circulating within the party that the Central Committee intended to give directions to party MPs to resign en bloc from Parliament and to boycott parliamentary elections.
The information reached a large number of cadres in various party branches. They were worried for the future of BSS and the left-wing movement. They decided to put forward the following views:
| (1) | "Giving directions to party MPs to resign en bloc" and "to boycott parliamentary elections" were major issues seriously affecting the future of BSS and the leftists. Such decisions ought to be made only after having full discussions within the party, and general consensus reached in a democratic manner. Only then should the final decision be put into practice. Without the general consensus, any decision made would be contrary to the established principles of the party. |
| (2) | Records showed that Lee Siew Choh once did make an arbitrary decision on his own against the party's will. Without any authorisation from the party, he made on his own an announcement to "boycott the National Service registration". Some cadres from party branches showed concern that Lee Siew Choh and his followers would play the same old tricks again. They might arbitrarily direct "the MPs to resign en bloc" and "to boycott parliamentary elections". |
With a view to preventing Lee Siew Choh from repeating the similar mistake, it was necessary for the representatives from all party branches to come together, and had full discussions before bringing the matter up to the party Central Committee.
On the initiative of Poh Ber Liak, Chairman of Changi/Tampines branch, also the MP of the Tampines Constituency, a joint meeting of the chairmen and secretaries from all party branches was held at the Geylang East Branch, for the purpose of exchanging views on such important issues. This was known as the "the incident of 12 party branches."
In reality, 14 branches attended the meeting, namely Changi/Tampines, East Geylang, West Geylang, Rochor, Joo Chiat/Siglap, Kallang/Aljunied, Anson/ Telok Ayer, Cairnhill/River Valley, Geylang Serai Market/Kembangan, Bras Basah, Stamford, and Crawford. （Note: No record for another 2 branches since they did not sign the joint petition after the meeting.)
Koo Young and Chia Thye Poh, two of the Central Committee members, and staunch supporters of Lee Siew Choh, attended the joint meeting of the 12 branches as observers as soon as they got wind of the agenda of the joint meeting.
The issues discussed included the practice of intra-party democracy, and the practice of intra-party democratic centralism. The resolutions adopted were disclosed in the joint petition to the Central Committee.
Joint Petition by the 12 branches to the party Central Committee
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| About Por Ber Liak – legislative assemblyman of Tampines Constituency |
| Poh Ber Liak, was a Nanyang University graduate from the History Department. Together with 10 other Nanyang University graduates, stood as BSS candidates in the Singapore Legislative Assembly General Election in 1963. Poh was elected member of the Tampines Constituency. |
| In 1965, he led the 12 party branches to present a joint petition to the Central Committee of the party to discuss “intra-party democracy”, and to prevent Lee Siew Choh from adopting his extremely radical political line of struggle. But Koo Young and Chia Thye Poh, the strong supporters of Lee Siew Choh, thwarted all efforts made by Poh and the 12 party branches. |
| Eventually, Poh was expelled from the party by the Central Committee in March 1967. After leaving BSS, he immersed himself in the commercial world. Since then, he has not involved himself in any social movement. |
| The main ground for Poh's expulsion given by the Central Committee was that "towards the end of 1965, he openly involved himself in the rebellious activities of the so-called '12 party branches'. He misled them as well as other branches into opposing the policies of the party. He also persuaded the leading cadres of various branches to make an attempt to strip the national Central Committee of its power.”[See Zhen Xian Bao (阵线报) 221st issue of March 1967.] |
"The 2nd Central Committee of the Party has existed for more than a year. It has exceeded the prescribed period. But a new Central Committee has yet to be formed. The practice of intra-party democratic centralism has not been adhered to. The present Central Committee therefore has no authority to represent the majority view of our comrades.
The chairmen and secretaries of the 12 party branches, including myself, had no alternative but to hold a joint meeting among ourselves, for the purpose of discussing counter-measures to resolve the problems arising from the non-compliance with the principle of intra-party democracy. We have adopted the following resolutions in the meeting:
"The joint meeting requested the Central Committee to convene a meeting of the chairmen and secretaries of all party branches as soon as possible for purposes of discussing the issue of intra-party democracy. Before holding such meeting, the Central Committee should refrain from making any decision relating to all major issues (including boycotting the election and the en bloc resignation of the MPs)."
On 18 November, a joint meeting was held at the party headquarters between the Central Committee and the chairmen as well as secretaries of the party branches. In attendance were: the Central Committee members, namely, Lee Siew Choh, Koo Young, Chia Thye Poh, Kow Kee Seng of the one part, and the chairmen and secretaries of party branches of the other part.
In the course of discussion, the issue of the joint petition signed by the 12 party branches, touching on the issues boycotting the election and the en bloc resignation of the MPs was raised. But all the Central Committee members present denied having had any discussion so far by the Central Committee. Lee Siew Choh meanwhile alleged that Poh Ber Liak was guilty of distortion of facts, thereby creating something out of his own imagination. Poh Ber Liak was also labelled as a "rumour-monger ".
The joint meeting of the day was in actual fact not meant for having discussions about the joint petition of the 12 party branches. But it ended up focussing discussions on it.
Did Poh really indulge in "rumour-mongering"? Or did the Central Committee members conceal the truth from the party cadres at that time? Subsequent events belied the allegations made by Lee Siew Choh at the joint meeting. It turned out that BSS under Lee Siew Choh gave up "parliamentary struggle" and abandoned "lawful organisations. The denial and allegations could not hold water.
Eventually, the leading cadres of the 12 party branches were expelled from the party, or ostracised after having been accused of being "anti-party" and "anti-people". This was the first schism that appeared in the party after the return of Lee Siew Choh to the party fold.
The incident of the "12 party branches" served to remind us of the following:
| (1) | After suffering defeat in the 1963 Singapore election, Lee Siew Choh and others began to entertain the idea of abandoning "parliamentary struggle." Even before his return to the party fold in 1965, he had already entertained such idea. He pronounced that "parliamentary democracy was dead" in Singapore, and instructed BSS MPs to resign en bloc, and boycotted parliamentary elections and so on. | |
| But the great majority of cadres and masses, within and without the party, continued to protect and preserve the leadership of Lim Chin Siong and others. They were in favour of the line of struggle propounded by Lim Chin Siong. They were almost akin to diehards believing in the principle of "persisting in the constitutional struggle so long as favourable conditions still exist for such struggle." | ||
| Before gaining full control of the various organisations having connections with BSS, Lee Siew Choh and his cohorts refrained from taking rash move. They opted to conceal their long-term agenda. | ||
| (2) | After the return of Lee Siew Choh to the party fold, he could not wait to level his various criticisms against the party. The major criticisms were directed against the strategy of the left-wing movement. His views were as follows: | |
| a. | Lim Chin Siong and other party leaders made the wrong decisions to call for the casting of blank vote in the "referendum", and to call for "registration for national service in principle". | |
| b. | The slogans "Dissolve Malaysia, withdraw from Malaysia" and "Struggle for genuine independence and complete sovereignty" put forward by the trade unionists were manifestations of "right opportunism". | |
| c. | The decision of the Labour Party of Malaya to engage in "mass struggle supplemented by parliamentary struggle" was also "right opportunism". | |
| In short, Lee Siew Choh and others emulated the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" taking place in China. They raised the alarm against the so-called "right opportunism" in Malaya and Singapore, while projecting themselves as "revolutionaries". | ||
| All those who held views to the contrary were labelled as "traitors", "enemy agents" or "right opportunists". The crude manner in dealing with the issue by Lee Siew Choh and his cohorts contributed in no small way to the schism and decimation of BSS as well as the entire left-wing movement. | ||
| (3) | In August 1966, Lee Siew Choh and others eventually managed to wrest control of the leadership of left-wing trade unions in Singapore. In early 1967, when launching a campaign against the amendments to the "Societies Act"and "Trade Unions Act", they called upon the left-wing organisations "not to submit annual reports"to the relevant authorities. | |
| They were not bothered whether such unwise move would render unlawful all left-wing organisations. Such move ultimately led to the de-registration of all lawful left-wing organisations. That simply suited the dire need of the ruling party to eliminate lawful left-wing organisations in one fell swoop. | ||
| In the circumstances, is it not a fact that the so-called "correct political line of struggle" adopted by Lee Siew Choh had served extremely well the interests of the ruling elite, enabling them to completely wipe out the left-wing movement? | ||
| It would appear that Lee Kuan Yew did everything possible to persecute Lim Chin Siong, so as to allow Lee Siew Choh to be at the helm of BSS and the left-wing movement. | ||
| Consequently, the PAP took full control of the political arena of Singapore, and establish dominance over Parliament for decades. PAP is now in an entrenched position that can hardly be dislodged. | ||
3. Lee Siew Choh's proposal "not to submit annual reports" to the relevant authorities, and to campaign against the amendments to the "Trade Unions Act", catered to the need of the ruling party to eliminate the left-wing labour movement.
In order to put into practice their "correct line of struggle", Lee Siew Choh and BSS leaders under his control, instructed BSS MPs to resign en bloc, and directed the left-wing cadres and masses to boycott parliamentary elections.
They then instructed left-wing organisations "not to submit annual reports" to the relevant authorities, and to campaign against the amendments to the "Trade Unions Act" and "Societies Act". Consequent upon taking such radical action, many lawful left-wing organisations, such as left-wing alumni associations, cultural groups, trade unions and others, were de-registered by the relevant authorities one after another on grounds of non-compliance with the statutory requirement to submit annual reports.
On the other hand, those organisations that managed to avoid the fate of being de-registered, were almost absorbed wholesale by the PAP ruling elite into their ranks.
One of the important provisions of the "Trade Unions (Amendment) Act" and "Societies (Amendment) Act" introduced by the Lee Kuan Yew ruling clique, was that "Unless exemption has been granted by the minister, a non-citizen or a criminal shall not hold any position in any organisation."
This would mean that when a registered society or trade union re-elected its executive committee, it must submit a list of executive committee members to the Registrar for approval. Any member that was not approved must be replaced. Failure to do so, would render the organisation liable to be de-registered.
Such amendments were obviously meant to ensure that any individual who was not a citizen, or had been imprisoned, or deemed to be of dubious character, was not allowed to hold any office in any society or trade union. The control over lawful organisations was tightened. The left-wing societies or trade unions were adversely affected, to the extent of facing de-registration.
It was a well-known fact that, immediately after the separation of Singapore from Malaysia, numerous staff members of the left-wing organisations were holding Malayan identity cards. They were not Singapore citizens. Lee Kuan Yew and his ruling clique were bent on completely weeding out "non-citizens" and progressive elements who had been arrested and detained for taking part in demonstrations or protest marches.
In those days, high spirits were undoubtedly shown by militant cadres and a minority of the masses in supporting the campaign "not to submit annual reports" as well as in opposing unreasonable draconian laws. It had left an indelible impression on the populace. But their unwise actions, were contrary to the interests and aspirations of the population, working masses in particular. Such acts were tantamount to putting all eggs into one basket, and posed a threat to the future of lawful organisations. On recollection, it was heart-breaking indeed.
Looking back, the left-wing leaders should have refrained from indulging themselves in various uncalled for boycott actions. The authorities concerned would not have the opportunity of de-registering with ease the lawful organisations. On hindsight, if a well-planned strategy was adopted to protect and preserve the lawful organisations for effectively raising the awareness of the masses, the Singapore left-wing movement (especially the trade union movement) would not have suffered the fate of rapid decline and total disintegration.
Practice has proven that Lee Siew Choh's line of struggle to abandon the "parliamentary struggle" and to detach themselves from "lawful organisations", is the best illustration of "being divorced from the masses" and "taking uncalculated risks".
For instance, three trade unions, namely, Singapore Commercial House and Factory Employees' Union (SCHFEU), Singapore Rubber Employees' Union (SREU), Singapore Shoe Makers' Union (SSMU) were de-registered for failing to submit annual reports to the relevant authorities. The union members were unhappy with their leaders for not submitting annual reports, and in the general stoppage of work, resulting in the de-registration of their trade unions. The public at large, particularly those who subscribed to "the rule of law", aired their grievances about such rash actions.
Before the de-registration of the 3 trade unions, they made the following remarks in a "Letter to Fellow Workers"dated 25 May 1967:
"Today, we, the left-wing trade unions in Singapore, have all along been determined to oppose vehemently the amendments to the Trade Unions Act. If we need to make sacrifices, we are prepared to carry on our struggle till the end!"
They advised their members and fellow workers not to join any other trade union after the de-registration of their unions, for fear of falling into the trap of the ruling clique headed by Lee Kuan Yew. They might be compelled to betray the interests of the working class, by way of being forced into joining the NTUC (National Trades Union Congress), or accepting the Trade Unions (Amendment ) Act.
"Those left-wing trade unions which strongly oppose the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, sooner or later will be de-registered, and may even give up their steadfast stance, to become the so-called "left-wing unions"under the control of the PAP. We must draw a clear line of demarcation and sever ties with them." (See Zhen Xian Bao (阵线报), 28 May 1967)
However, union members ignored the advice of the union leaders. Before the de-registration of their unions, on their own initiative, they proceeded to join other unions which had yet to be de-registered.
Some typical examples could be found in some of the factory units under the SCHFEU, such as Hume Pipe Factory, Thornycroft Shipyard, Singapore Tobacco Factory, Sime Darby Factory etc., followed by Gim Huat Quarry, Daguan (大关), Erguan (二关), Swee construction and Chua Kit Seng Quarry. Representatives of workers of quarry factories had negotiations with Kweh Chu Pang, the incumbent Secretary-General of Singapore Industrial Workers' Union (SIWU), with a view to joining SIWU.
Some trade unions' members expressed their reluctance to abandon "lawful organisations" just to join other trade unions that had not been de-registered. Under such circumstances, how could they expect support or sympathy of workers and the people from all walks of life?
➀ To the working class, losing trade unions is tantamount to losing the "protective umbrella" that safeguards their vital interests.
If any registered society, other than a trade union, is shut down, the vital interests of its members will not be directly threatened or adversely affected. At most, the members will leave the organisation. Some members may even feel "free" after the de-registration of the society.
But it is very different for trade union members. Once they lose the protection of the trade union, they may soon face retaliatory measures or persecution by their employers. They may face dismissals for their employment, reduction of wages, loss of welfare benefits, and so on. Any improvement in their working conditions achieved through the struggle of the union over the years might be withdrawn by the employers.
Union workers knew full well that before joining the trade union, they were subjected to arbitrary oppression and exploitation by the employers. Most of them did not dare to voice out their grievances for fear of losing their jobs, or the livelihood of their families would be at stake.
After joining the left-wing trade unions, the union would fight for better living and working conditions for their members. Union members could earn much better income and live more dignified lives.
They might be of different races and religions, and various cultural and political backgrounds, but all of them regarded trade unions as their protectors. They loved their trade unions. They supported and responded to all reasonable calls of their unions, and were able to forged unity among themselves. Union members were the source of strength for the trade unions.
Negotiations between factory workers and employers were done collectively by the trade unions on behalf of the union members. Normally, an agreement would be entered into for one to two years. Under the agreement, the employers must provide working conditions and welfare conditions as agreed upon. The terms and conditions would be negotiable upon the expiry of the previous agreement. A fresh agreement would then be signed.
Without trade unions, union members would lose their collective bargaining power. In the absence of trade unions, there would be no one to represent them. Under such circumstances, the employers, particularly some obstinate foreign investors, would seize the opportunity to fleece the workers. In some cases, the employers were reluctant to renegotiate with the workers on new terms and conditions upon the expiry of the previous agreement. They arbitrarily reduced workers' wages; increased workload; and even resorted to dismissal of some workers on flimsy grounds.
For instance, in September 1967, the employer in Hume Pipe Factory made it difficult in the negotiation for a fresh agreement upon expiry of the previous one. Instead, they expelled the workers' representatives. The incident angered all the workers in the factory. In retaliation, they decided to stop work, commencing on 7 September 1967. The strike lasted for 41 days.
Since the existence of trade unions directly affected the vital interests of each and every union member as well as his family. For each and every worker, having a trade union as a "protective umbrella" was considered an extremely important matter. As such, one could hardly convince them to agree to the novel idea of "not to submit annual reports" to the relevant authorities, and of opposing the amendment to the Trade Unions Act, let alone the advice of not to join other unions after the de-registration of their unions. All this was detrimental to their vital interests.
Workers would therefore find various ways to join other trade unions for the sake of protecting their own interests. They were aware that the pro-establishment trade unions would not serve the workers' interests well, but they had to rely on such unions as a means of protection, to prevent themselves from being fleeced by the employers. They generally felt it better to have a "backing" than none.
Practice has proved that the campaign "not to submit annual reports" to the relevant authorities, giving rise to de-registration of trade unions, was obviously an extremely erroneous decision. The workers' level of awareness was never taken into consideration. It was prejudicial to their interests and aspirations. My personal experience narrated below may be instructive in this regard.
➁ A good illustration: A quarry worker originally a SCHFEU member, crossed over to another trade union to carry on the struggle against persecution by employers. It proved to be conducive to the campaign against the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act.
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| The first picture above shows the scene of a woman worker (see white arrow) being beaten up. She screamed for help. The second picture shows the brutal anti-riot police pointing a pistol at an elderly worker on strike. [See Zhen Xian Bao (阵线报), 315th issue of 12 January 1969.] |
| On 3 January 1969, the Lee Kuan Yew regime sent more than a dozen of anti-riot vehicles and over 300 anti-riot policemen to Er Guan quarry situated about 9 miles from Bukit Timah, in order to disperse by brute force the workers on strike. The brutal anti-riot policemen used batons to bash up the workers on strike. Even women workers were not spared. They went to the extent of firing shots at workers who would not succumb to violence. 3 shots were fired at one of the workers. More than 10 workers were injured, and 6 workers arrested. |
Early in the month of September 1968, the employer dismissed some workers without any reasonable cause. The fellow workers were compelled to stop work, and eventually went on strike. This was the second wave of strike actions undertaken (after the Hume Pipe factory strike) after the coming into force of the Trade Unions Amendment Act. The PAP ruling clique headed by Lee Kuan Yew, acting through the Labour Department, invoked the relevant provisions of the Trade Unions Amendment Act, to deprive the workers of their right to strike. They resorted to the "divide and rule" policy in dealing with workers in different factories.
During the strike, hundreds of police officers intervened and resorted to brute force in suppressing the workers on strike. They even fired shots at the workers on strike, arresting workers' representatives and union officers. Such violent actions on the part of the police force incurred great dissatisfaction and indignation of other workers from the same industry.
Workers from another 15 quarry factories under the leadership of Singapore Quarry Workers Union (SQWU), decided to join the rank of workers on strike. They stopped work as a gesture of protest against the ruthless actions against the workers by those in power, and in support of the struggle of the workers from the abovementioned 3 factories. The brutal repressive actions taken by the ruling clique also led to public outcry. The public at large voluntarily offered both material and moral support for the workers on strike.
The left-wing trade unions, political parties and organisations, as well as students initially were not in favour of the strikes undertaken by the 3 factories on the grounds that they disregarded the instructions "not to submit annual reports". But by reason of the far-reaching effect of the fast-development of the situation, the left-wing organisations chose not to treat them as rivals. They instantly decided to give their support to the struggle of the workers on strike.
Some other trade unions such as Singapore Restaurant, Bar, Eating & Coffeeshop Employees' Union and Singapore Motor Workshop Employees' Union, initially not in favour of the policy of "not to summit annual reports", were deeply moved by the courageous acts of the left-wing organisations in rendering full support for the strike actions. Other trade unions originally adopting an independent stand, such as Thornycroft Shipyard, Singapore Tobacco Factory and Sim Darby Factory (all former members of SCHFEU), decided to follow Hume Pipe factory in joining SIWU. The strike of Hume Pipe factory unfortunately ended up in failure on 18 October 1967.
The leadership of SIWU persuaded these factory units to withdraw from SIWU, and established independent trade unions in the interests of the workers. With the assistance of Tan Siew Chwee, they were registered as independent labour unions. The left-wing organisations in the Malay Peninsula also voiced their support for the struggle.
Despite the brutal suppression of those in power, under the resolute leadership of the Singapore Quarry Workers Union (SQWU) and by virtue of the unity of the workers, Gim Huat quarry workers achieved victory after going on strike for more than 180 days. Da Guan and Er Guan quarry workers also succeeded in their strike action after going through tough struggle. It is worth mentioning that both Kweh Chu Pang and Tan Siew Chwee had played a very important role and made invaluable contributions to the final victory of the strike actions.
As a result of the struggle against oppression and the fight for workers' rights, the anti-labour nature of the ruling party had been laid bare, and the reactionary nature of the relevant provisions in the Trade Unions Amendment Act exposed. The amendments to the Act prohibited workers from taking industrial actions. All this served to raise the awareness of the quarry workers involved as well as that of the working masses in other industries.
At that time, the left-wing labour movement were suffering from the crackdown by the ruling clique. There were internal disputes and sabotage by the enemy from within, resulting in the weakening and decimation of the movement.
If there was unity and unified leadership in the left-wing labour movement, and well-organised support obtaining in the early years, the quarry workers would surely have won the material and spiritual support of the workers in other industries and organisations as well as the people from all walks of life.
It enabled the struggle to develop to a new height, and perhaps triggered an incident similar to the incident of "5.12 strike" by Hock Lee bus workers in 1955. The struggle against the Trade Unions Amendment Act reached an all-time high. It dealt heavy blows to the reactionary regime, and in turn made contribution in no small way to the left-wing political movement.
➂ The campaign "not to submit annual reports" to the relevant authorities resulted in de-registration of trade unions. Those who were opposed to the campaign were viciously attacked by the "ultra-leftist leader". The left-wing labour movement thereby suffered severe damage, heading fast towards extinction.
In mid-1966, BSS leaders headed by Lee Siew Choh openly attacked the trade unionists, and orchestrated a change in the trade union leadership, eventually tearing apart the left-wing labour movement.
When the Trade Unions Amendment Act came into force in early 1967, the survival of left-wing trade unions was threatened. In the second half of 1967, some trade unions toed the radical line of struggle proposed by Lee Siew Choh. They refused to submit annual reports and the list of their executive committees to the relevant authorities. As expected, the trade unions concerned were de-registered one after another.
In pursuing the policy of abandoning "parliamentary struggle" as well as "lawful organisations", the leaders of BSS headed by Lee Siew Choh together with certain trade union leaders disregarded the aspirations and the needs of the workers, and "resolutely opposed the Trade Unions Amendment Act", resulting in the left-wing trade unions concerned being de-registered.
The left-wing labour movement inevitably suffered serious damage, culminating in its speedy extinction. Viewed objectively, Lee Siew Choh radical line of struggle in reality catered to the needs of the powers that be, aimed at destroying completely the left-wing labour movement.
The Trade Unions Amendment Act stipulated that, a trade union having conducted its re-election, must submit a list of the executive committee members for the approval of the authorities. Failure to comply with such legal procedure would render the trade union unlawful. Any unlawful trade union would have to face two possible consequences:
| (1) | In any labour negotiations or labour disputes, the Ministry of Labour could declare that the "unlawful trade union" had no right to represent the workers. The trade union would then lose its influence over the workers. |
| (2) | If the Ministry was unable to have control over the leaders and the activities of a trade union, it would summarily declare the de-registration of the union. For instance, even before the de-registration of the SCHFEU, the Ministry declared that it would not recognise the right of SCHFEU to represent the workers concerned. |
| (3) | On 28 May 1967, Zhen Xian Bao (阵线报) reported that "Workers from two factories (i.e., Hong Leong Cement Products Factory, Eagle Brand Aerated Water Factory) decided to join the SCHFEU. But under the threat and at the instigation of the PAP ruling clique, the employer and the Ministry of Labour refused to recognize the right of the SCHFEU to represent these two new unions, purely on the ground that the SCHFEU was opposed to the Trade Unions Amendment Act." |
On 5 April 1967, the SCHFEU received the notice of its de-registration, which would take effect on 6 July 1967. Some of its factory units requested to join SIWU, but SIWU had also decided to participate in the campaign "not to submit annual reports" (SIWU had yet to receive the "de-registration" notice).
Some of these factory units, such as Singapore Tobacco Factory, accepted the advice. They formed an independent trade union with the assistance and guidance of Tan Siew Chwee, one of the staff members of SIWU. Some quarry factory units, such as Gim Huat, Da Guan and Er Guan quarry collectively joined the neutral trade union, namely, Singapore Quarry Workers Union (SQWU), while some other factory units had no choice but to become members of NTUC (National Trade Union Congress).
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| The above is a scanned copy of the eye-catching title of the 1968 newspaper that reported Kweh Chu Pang, the then Secretary-General of SIWU was fined for allegedly "leading an illegal strike". The background of this incident was as follows: |
| In 1967, 544 workers of Hume Pipe Factory, ex- members of the SCHFEU, insisted on joining SIWU on the verge of de-registration of SCHFEU, when the renegotiation with the employer was about to take place. The labour unrest broke out right after they joined SIWU. |
| This was the first labour tide after the commencement of the Trade Unions Amendment Act. SIWU paid a huge price for leading the strike. All their Central Committee members were charged with "leading an illegal strike." In the court, Kweh Chu Pang, the then Secretary-General claimed full responsibility for the strike, so that the other Central Committee members were given acquittal. |
| Kweh was fined S$400. In addition, he was also charged for being a "non-citizen" serving in the trade union, and fined S$200. But he chose not to pay the fine, and was sentenced to five months’ imprisonment. After the failure of the strike, workers of Hume Pipe Factory reluctantly crossed over to the NTUC controlled by the establishment. |
It is worth mentioning that during the jail term of Kweh Chu Pang, Tan Siew Chwee took charge of the strike. The second day immediately after Kweh's release from prison, he took over from Tan Siew Chwee, and led the strike to final victory.
At the critical juncture in mid-1967, some level-headed leftist trade unionists together with SCHFEU's cadres, refused to toe the line of Lee Siew Choh and the like. They would prefer to preserve the lawful status of the union, to serve the interests of the workers. They decided to "submit annual reports" to the relevant authorities so that the union could be salvaged.
Though they never criticised publicly the campaign "not to submit annual reports", they were ruthlessly attacked by BSS leaders headed by Lee Siew Choh, and by the trade unionists who were willing to toe the line of Lee Siew Choh.
Some trade unions such as Singapore Hairdressers' Union, Singapore Coffeeshop Employees' Union, Singapore Fish Merchant Employees' Union, Amalgamated Malayan Pineapple Workers' Union were severely divided due to differences in opinion. Other trade unions, such as Singapore Metal Box Workers' Union, Singapore Transport Vessels Workers' Union, Singapore Marine Products Workers' Union, Singapore Rattan workers' Union, Confederation of Singapore Engineering Tradesman Workers on the whole agreed to "submit annual reports" to the relevant authorities.
The trade unionists or the cadres of the SCHFEU who were against the campaign "not to submit annual reports" were all publicly condemned as "serving the interests of the reactionaries" and labelled as "careerists, anti-union, anti-worker, anti-leftist, anti-people, and anti-revolution". All these unfounded and vicious allegations were published in Zhen Xian Bao (阵线报). Whether such allegations were true or otherwise, will be left to be verified by the historians.
➃ The 1965 SCHFEU incident served to uncover the vicious attempt on the part of the ruling party to engineer the forced departure of the influential trade unionists with a view to curbing the development of the trade unions.
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| [Picture above] The cover of the 1962 souvenir bulletin in commemoration of the Labour Day by Singapore left-wing trade unions. This was the last occasion demonstrating the collective fighting spirit of the Singapore working class before the 1963 “Operation Coldstore”. |
| Appended below is the list of the Labour Day Joint Celebration Committee members: |
|
The following points are to be taken note of:
| (1) | "Submitting annual reports" was not a new requirement. It had already existed before amendment to the Trade Unions Act; |
| (2) | Even if the list of the Executive Committee is not approved after "submitting the annual reports", it is not the end of the world; |
| (3) | To overcome the issue, the union may adopt the "semi-open and semi-hidden" way of appointing staff members. |
In the early years, this method had been used to facilitate the development of the left-wing labour movement during the military rule. It produced brilliant results. SATU also vaguely hinted about this method in the guiding policy published in an article in August 1963.
If any executive committee member or staff member failed to get approval, he could be replaced by someone else. Anyone who initially worked in the open could go backstage. He could still make his contributions to the union. Such alternative would serve to preserve the "lawful organisation". The member concerned could continue to lead the workers in the fight against anti-labour legislation. There is no difficulty in making such a move.
Tan Siew Chwee was the trade unionist leading the former SBHEU (Singapore Business Houses Employees' Union). He was an important figure who led the English-educated working masses to join the left-wing labour movement. They turned out to be a militant force at that time. Tan Siew Chwee served as the Vice Chairman of the SBHEU in 1960 and 1961, and was elected its acting Chairman in 1962. He was also elected the acting Secretary of the Labour Day Preparatory Committee in 1962 and the Organisational Secretary of the first SATU Council.
On 2 February 1963, he was arrested along with other left-wing leaders. He was released with conditions attached about 4 months later, in June 1963. On the nomination day of the 1963 election, he was again arrested and detained, thereby depriving him of the opportunity to contest in the election.
After his release with conditions attached, he was active in handling cases of labour disputes for SCHFEU. In April 1965, some restrictions imposed on him by the authorities were partially removed. He became more active in the trade union affairs, elected as the 10th Secretary of General Affairs of the SCHFEU.
As usual, SCHFEU submitted the list of Executive Committee members and the financial report to the Registry of Societies. The Registry ordered the union to remove Tan Siew Chwee from his position and to revoke his union membership, failing which SCHFEU would be de-registered.
SCHFEU decided to issue a statement to protest against the persecution of Tan Siew Chwee, and against the threat issued against the union. Meanwhile, Tan Siew Chwee was removed from his position as secretary of general affairs. But he continued to make his contributions to the union by way of using his expertise in solving labour disputes. He had moved "from the front stage to the backstage".
This was a strategy that served to expose the unreasonable action taken by those in power to persecute influential trade unionists. At the same time, it helped forestall the de-registration of the union, enabling it to carry on playing the leading role in the struggle for workers' rights and interests.
Tan Siew Chwee was well-versed in labour laws and had vast experience in dealing with labour disputes, negotiating for collective agreements. He represented many factory workers in the fight for their interests. He thereby gained the respect of the great majority of workers. If the authorities concerned chose to compel SEHFEU to dismiss him from representing the union, it would certainly incur the wrath and dissatisfaction of the workers.
The union, as an organisation, would be in a favourable position to fight for the interests of the workers, and would certainly receive the support of the members. Even if the union was de-registered, the members would give their support to the union, and abide by its decision. Therefore, adopting such rational strategy, the trade union could circumvent the scheme of those in power in compelling Tan Siew Chwee to leave the union to curb the normal development of SCHFEU.
Tan Siew Chwee was a prominent leader who dedicated his life to the left-wing labour movement. He led the English-educated employees in commercial industry to join the left-wing trade union in the 1960s. In 1965 he was elected secretary of general affairs of SCHFEU (Singapore Commercial House & Factory Employees' Union). However, he was prevented by the relevant authorities from becoming one of the executive committee members, on the ground that he was once a detainee under the Internal Security Act.
But he carried on leading the union behind the scenes. After de-registration of SCHFEU, he persisted in defending the rights and interests of the workers. He had made valuable contributions to the struggle for the autonomy of trade unions and the right of the labour movement to take the initiatives in the 1960s.
Before the "Operation Coldstore", he was elected the Acting Chairman of the Central Executive Committee during the congress of the former SBHEU (Singapore Business Houses Employees' Union) on 19 August 1962. He was also the Acting Secretary-General of the Singapore Left-wing workers' Labour Day Joint Celebration Committee in 1962.
Research done by the author Chng Min Oh @ Zhuang Ming Hu revealed that, after MNLL (Malayan National Liberation League) made the clarion call to "Crush Malaysia" in March 1965, Foo tried to convince some prominent leaders of the left-wing trade unions to support Lee Siew Choh's extremist line of struggle.
Before the 1962 "Operation Coldstore", Foo was the Chairman of the former SBHEU. Both he and Tan Siew Chwee, (SBHEU Secretary-General) together led the English-educated workforce in the struggle for improving the welfare of the workers. This had caused unease and incurred the hatred of the powers that be.
As Secretary-General of the Singapore Workers' Labour Day Joint Celebration Committee, he had been charged twice for "causing hurt with intent" in the months of March and April, 1962. He was imprisoned for 3 months and 9 months respectively. The 12-month jail term disqualified him from holding the post of Secretary-General of the Labour Day Committee. But that did not deter him from fighting for the rights of the workers. While still serving his jail term, the representatives of the SBHEU gave him full support. On 19 August 1962, he was re-elected Chairman of the Central Executive Committee.
4. Factors at home and abroad that encouraged Barisan Sosialis Singapura (BSS) leaders headed by Lee Siew Choh and some trade unionists to embark on the path of extreme left opportunism, thereby alienating themselves from the broad masses.
BSS leaders headed by Lee Siew Choh, together with some trade unionists, embarked on the path of extreme left opportunism, thereby alienating themselves from the broad masses. It was closely related to the political development at home and abroad at that time. In brief, 4 main factors gave rise to the development of such unhealthy tendency:
➀ The Singapore left-wing political movement suffered brutal suppression by the ruling clique, resulting in the defeat of the left-wing forces in the general election. It spurred the growth of the radical left adventurism. Such erroneous thinking became widespread after BSS gave a free rein to Lee Siew Choh.
Many cadres in the left-wing movement in Singapore lacked adequate understanding of the complex and tortuous path of the national democratic struggle as well as the significance of the role of peaceful constitutional struggle.
After suffering defeat in the Referendum in 1962, there was considerable scepticism about peaceful constitutional struggle. Basically two types of ideological tendencies emerged:
| (1) | By reason of pessimism and disappointment, some cadres decided to give up the struggle. They elected to go down the slippery road of right capitulationism. |
| (2) | Some others were impetuous, and advocated a more radical form of struggle. They embarked upon the path of left adventurism. |
The left-wing movement in Singapore encountered various difficulties: crippled by the "Operation Coldstore" in February 1963; suffered defeat in the general election in September 1963; experienced another round of suppression in October; and the left-wing forces in Peninsular Malaya suffered defeat in the 1964 election.
This series of unfortunate events had an adverse influence on the left-wing movement in Singapore. After the Referendum, there was scepticism about the viability of peaceful constitutional struggle. The influence of left adventurism, in particular, was profound. Some leaders and cadres even entertained the idea of resorting to the unconstitutional means of struggle.
In the midst of such difficulties, on 29 April 1964, BSS held an extraordinary party congress. In the congress, the party adopted a resolution to discard the policy of "boycotting national service registration" as advocated by Lee Siew Choh. At the same time, Lee Siew Choh and 7 others were forced to resign from the party.
Less than a year later, on 7 March 1965, BSS leaders headed by Koo Yong and Chia Thye Poh openly admitted their mistakes in pursuing the policy of "boycotting national service registration", and in allowing Lee Siew Choh and 7 others to return to the party to resume their party positions previously held by them.
At the material time, the trade unions leadership headed by Chen Xin (also the chief editor of SCHFEU Bulletin) indicated their disapproval of the policy of BSS leaders to "seek unity" with Lee Siew Choh and 7 others. In a tactful and sincere manner, they expressed their views on "the autonomy of left-wing labour movement, which should not have been denied and overlooked."
The 3 guiding principles of the struggle put forward by Lim Chin Siong had not been fully appreciated, and they were not put into practice. On the contrary, open criticisms were levelled against such correct guiding principles. They were even subject to "intra-party review and rectification". These correct principles were subsequently labelled by Lee Siew Choh as "right-opportunism", "serving the interests of imperialism and reactionaries".
Looking back, "permitting Lee Siew Choh to take the helm as leaders of the left-wing movement upon his return to BSS" was obviously an erroneous move that was inconceivable. It turned out to be a major wrong decision made within the left-wing movement that resulted in promoting left adventurism, a line of struggle alienating the left-wing forces from the broad masses.
➁ The Central Committee of the CPM resumed armed struggle in 1962, sending task forces to the south, and recruiting underground activists. Such activities had a large influence over the cadres of the left-wing movement in Singapore that could not be underestimated.
Malaya achieved Independence on 31 August 1957. About a year later, towards the end of 1958, the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) "adopted a policy of ceasing activities (laying down the flag and still the drums), downsizing the troops and awaiting favourable conditions.
Party members or guerrilla fighters who had lost their revolutionary fervour and fighting spirit, as well as those aged, feeble, sickly or disabled, would be given fair treatment pursuant to the demobilization policy. They would be given allowance, and permitted to return to normal life in southern Thailand." (see Dialogue with Chin Peng: New Interpretation on CPM, edited by C.C. Chin 2006, p. 284).
But, by the end of 1961, CPM was inspired by the situation favourable to the revolution abroad, especially the revolutionary situation in the Indo-China Peninsula and the political cooperation between Sukarno (the Indonesian President) and the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia).
The ruling cliques of both Malaya and Singapore headed by Lee Kuan Yew and Abdul Rahman respectively, were in the midst of pushing through the Malaysia Plan, a form of the British neo-colonial rule. Under such circumstances, the CPM decided to resume armed struggle.
In 1962, the Central Committee of the CPM promulgated "The New Policy". "With the strong encouragement and support of the CPC (Communist Party of China) and Chairman Mao, the CPM finally set new guidelines, to strengthen the military force, rectify discipline and boost the morale of the guerrilla fighters, recruit new members, and to actively train the troops, in order to carry out a new revolutionary guerrilla warfare and make preparations for moving southward, and to build up task forces.
MNLA (the Malayan National Liberation Army) had by then only about 300 members left after demobilisation. But its membership swelled to 2,000 in just over a period of one to two years. (see Dialogue with Chin Peng: New Interpretation on CPM, edited by C.C. Chin, 2006, p. 284). According to Chin Peng, by 1961, the number of guerrilla fighters had increased to about 800, instead of the 2,000 mentioned above.
When the CPM resumed armed struggle, they began to recruit underground political personnel in Malaya and Singapore. The guerrilla fighters remained in the forests along the southern border of Siam." (See Chin Peng, My Side of History 《我方的历史》 2004, pp. 389-391)
In 1965, the CPM established an organisation MNLL (the Malayan National Liberation League) in Beijing. It had a branch in Indonesia. MNLL was to launch underground activities in Malaysia, and to support the constitutional struggle of the left-wing forces in Malaysia. On 15 March 1965, the MNLL issued its manifesto: "Malayan National Liberation League Manifesto: Crush Malaysia - Struggle for the Realization of Genuine Independence of Malaya" (see Dialogue with Chin Peng: New Interpretation on CPM edited by C.C. Chin 2006, p. 286)
The revival of the armed struggle by the CPM required recruitment of more underground members. Such move had a significant impact on the mindset of a large number of cadres. They were not happy with the tardy progress of the "constitutional struggle", and they looked upon the armed struggle as an alternative solution.
➂ The international struggle against revisionism, the practical lessons from the "peaceful transition", and the "Cultural Revolution" of China had a great impact on the left-wing movement in Singapore that could not be underestimated.
In the early 1960s, CPC (Communist Party of China) was highly critical of the Communist Party of Soviet Union for its revisionist line of "peaceful transition". The then powerful PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) carried on its revolution along the path of "peaceful transition". In 1965, it suffered tremendous military repression by the Suharto ruling clique in collaboration with the US imperialism. Tens of thousands of people were killed, but PKI was helpless and incapable of launching any counterattack.
Such bitter experience deepened in no small way the understanding of the impracticality of the policy of "peaceful transition" adopted by the oppressed peoples of Indonesia and other countries. Prior to this, towards the end of 1962, Parti Rakyat Brunei won by an absolute majority in the national election, but the British colonialists immediately resorted to ruthless military suppression of the party.
Such cruel facts of life had a huge political impact on the left-wing forces of Malaya and Singapore, who were in the midst of pursuing the peaceful constitutional struggle. During this period, CPC stepped up its propaganda, calling upon the oppressed nations and peoples across the world to seize political power by armed struggle. In particular, it promoted armed struggle in the region of Southeast Asia.
Then in June 1966, the CPC started the "Great Cultural Revolution" in China. It was officially launched on 8 August 1966 by the Central Committee of the CPC. The CPC leadership claimed:
"a large number of important figures representing the bourgeoisie, and counter-revolutionary revisionists have infiltrated into the party, the government, the army, and the cultural circle" and "the capitalist roaders within the party have formed a bourgeois headquarters in the central government. It is pursuing a revisionist line in politics and organisation. It has planted agents in autonomous regions of various municipalities/ provinces and central departments."
"The struggles in the past have failed to provide any solution to the numerous problems. Only in the Cultural Revolution, when the broad masses have been openly and fully mobilised, starting from the top to the bottom, can the above-mentioned dark sides be exposed. Only then can the power be recaptured from the capitalist roaders."
This unprecedented historical tragedy in China, lasting for 10 years (1966-1976), was later described by the subsequent CPC leadership as "an internal turmoil erroneously created by the leaders, while the counter-revolutionaries capitalised on it, bringing about serious disasters to the party, country and the people of all nationalities."
The theory and practice of the "Cultural Revolution" in China had in turn become the guiding principles for action and affected the thinking of certain leaders in the left-wing movement (mainly Lee Siew Choh and some leaders of BSS under his influence) as well as cadres in Singapore and Malaysia.
Lee Siew Choh slavishly adopted the practice of "Cultural Revolution". He projected himself as a "great leader", starting a campaign against "right opportunism" within and without the party, and even the entire left-wing movement in Malaysia. He labelled everyone who disagreed with him or challenged his leadership as "enemy agents or bad elements of all descriptions infiltrated into the party". The entire left-wing movement was torn asunder. In any event, such campaign came to an abrupt end.
➃ The flames of war raging in Southeast Asia caused the leftist cadres in Singapore and Malaysia to be imbued with radical thinking, contemplating taking up armed struggle.
In the meantime, the US imperialism had spearheaded its struggle against China in place of the Soviet Union. Its global strategy was to focus on Asia, instead of the Western Europe. In order to realize its pipe-dream of " dominating the world through US-Soviet cooperation", it expanded its military bases and increased its armed forces in Japan, South Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia and other countries. It also waged a war of aggression against Vietnam and Indochina.
It stepped up control and domination over Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines and other countries, and regarded them as the "stable rear area" for carrying out its aggression against the entire Indochina. The ultimate goal of the US imperialism was to turn the entire Southeast Asia into a springboard for launching a war of aggression on a larger scale against China.
In the light of the situation then, the peoples of Southeast Asian countries commenced armed struggles against the US imperialism and the domestic pro-American reactionary regimes. The Communist Party of Thailand in August 1965, the Communist Party of North Kalimantan in 1965, and the Communist Party of Philippine in 1967 respectively launched their armed struggles.
The CPM resumed its armed struggle a few years earlier in 1962. The flames of war raging in Southeast Asia caused the leftist cadres in Singapore and Malaysia to be imbued with radical thinking of taking up armed struggle as well.
Towards the end of 1961, when the CPM was in the course of preparing the revival of the armed struggle in Malaya, Musa Ahmad, the then Chairman of CPM, predicted with confidence that:
"with the assistance of China, we are in a position to take over Malaya in five years' time."
"Ah Hai who was in Thailand, also felt that it was possible with the assistance from China. When responding to Chin Peng in Beijing, Ah Hai expressed his willingness to lead the armed uprising for reactivating their struggle. Xiao Zhang also offered his support." [See My Side of History 《我方的历史》 pp. 389-390].
With the financial assistance of the CPC, the CPM decided to resume its armed struggle that was discontinued about 3 years back in 1959. The leaders of the CPM expressed their confidence in the future of the struggle. Some of them were even inexplicably enthusiastic. It was therefore not surprising that a large number of cadres entertained the radical idea of participating in the armed struggle.
In short, the 4 factors referred to above encouraged Lee Siew Choh and leaders of BSS as well as some trade unionists, to embark on the path of left opportunism. 2 of the factors were internal ones, i.e. of local origin; while the other 2 were external factors. The internal factors were of utmost importance. The external factors were subsidiary, but would only be of any effect through the influence of internal factors. Hence, the rapid development of "left opportunism" was mainly due to internal factors.
5. The erroneous decision made by the leading organisation of the left-wing movement was the decisive internal factor, contributing to the collapse of the left-wing movement as it led the left-wing movement to embark on the path of radical left opportunism, thereby alienating themselves from the broad masses.
Practice has proven that Lee Siew Choh, after gaining full control of BSS leadership, emulated the careerists in the "Cultural Revolution" in China. His extreme leftist inclinations misled those cadres and masses who were of "left opportunism". He resorted to unscrupulous manoeuvres in eliminating dissidents within and without the party and arbitrary implementation of the so-called "correct revolutionary line". Such unhealthy trend inevitably led to the development of schism in the party and the movement.
The left-wing movement was misguided to the extent of abandoning "parliamentary struggle" and "lawful organisations", resulting in the disappearance of the "lawful organisations" led by the left-wing cadres and masses. Even the semi-open and semi-underground student movement was completely destroyed.
Those union members painstakingly developed by the previous left-wing trade unionists were simply discarded by Lee Siew Choh only to be absorbed by the pro-PAP trade unions. This led to the collapse of the left-wing labour movement as well as the entire left-wing movement painstakingly developed over a long period of 40 years or so. Up till now, no sign of revival of such movements is forthcoming.
Last year, an article "Consensus about the history and prospects of the revolution of Malaya" (《关于马来亚革命历史和前景的共识》) by Zhong QiZhu (钟启褚), was circulating among some former leftists in Singapore. The article touched on the left-wing movement in the 1960s. Appended below are some excerpts from the article:
"On the eve of the "February 2 Incident" 1963, the anti-Merger struggle waged in Singapore, was mainly designed to facilitate the preparation for the withdrawal of cadres from open struggle, in anticipation of impending mass arrests. It was to forestall the suppression to be carried out by Lee Kuan Yew in collaboration with the British imperialist and Tunku Abdul Rahman.
A large number of cadres were sent to Indonesia in an attempt to beat a hasty retreat, but only unilateral connection was allowed between cadres (Note: Some cadres could have retreated to Peninsular Malaya). As the revolution was expected to experience a low tide in the near future, no protest marches or demonstrations had been organised against mass arrests.
They erred in pinning much hope on winning the 1963 general election. They were too optimistic about the possibility of seizing political power.
But the serious mistake made at this stage was to abandon parliamentary struggle. Against the backdrop of Sino-Soviet polemics in 1963 and the subsequent Chinese Cultural Revolution, Lee Siew Choh was dogmatic enough to blindly adopt the radical line of class struggle by way of abandoning lawful parliamentary struggle in the fight against the enemy.
This went against the guiding principles of waging struggles on just grounds, with advantage and with restraint. Comrades having diverse views were regarded as enemies, resulting in serious damage being done to the urban struggle in Malaya Peninsula and Singapore."
The writer in his extrapolation as evidenced in the excerpts above, ignored the fact that the CPM leaders decided to allow Lee Siew Choh to rejoin BSS as a victor on 7 Mar 1965 and allowing him to replace Lim Chin Siong as the leading figure of the left-wing movement. That was a big mistake since it facilitated the widespread of the idea of left-adventurism by Lee Siew Choh.
According to an insider, the representative of the CPM in Singapore believed that, no other "influential individual" on the open front apart from Lee Siew Choh. The open united front needed him. Therefore, they tried by all means to coax him into rejoining BSS to play a leading role in the party. To achieve this purpose, CPM representative issued the following directions over a period of time:
| (1) | to abandon the original policy of "remaining dormant for the time being; keeping cadres hidden; preserving the strength of the forces; and awaiting the opportune moment"; |
| (2) | to support Lee Siew Choh's proposal to "boycott registration for national service"; |
| (3) | to support Lee Siew Choh's proposal to "abandon parliamentary struggle, and launch extra-parliamentary mass struggle". |
Some CPM grassroots cadres well-versed with the situation in Singapore, were not in favour of such "directions". They had arguments with the representative for one whole week. But in the end, they had to give in because of the stringent discipline: any "order" issued from above must be obeyed without question.
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| [Picture above] A scanned copy of a statement "About the Unity of the Left-wing Movement" released by SCHFEU [See SCHFEU Bulletin, Issue 4 of 28 February 1965]. The statement was released a week before BSS welcomed the return of Lee Siew Choh to the party fold. SCHFEU tactfully expressed its disagreement with the decision of BSS leaders to give way to Lee Siew Choh. |
Before Lee Siew Choh's return to the party, and during the initial period of his return (1964-1966), the majority of cadres and masses in the left-wing movement insisted on adhering to the strategy of carrying on with the "constitutional struggle" as expounded by Lim Chin Siong. In particular, trade unions having a large membership [Note 5] refused to give up "constitutional struggle".
At that time, the labour movement was under the leadership of a liaison secretariat formed by the left-wing organisations and trade unions. The liaison secretariat held a different view on the issue of Lee Siew Choh's return to the party.
Before Lee's return, Chia Thye Poh, one of the BSS Central Committee members, invited Tan Seng Hin @ Chen Xin [formerly known as Tan Sin, Chief Editor of SCHFEU Bulletin] to meet him at the headquarters of BSS. Chia made a request that the various trade unions issue statements to welcome Lee's return for the purpose of taking over the leadership of the party.
The trade union representative diplomatically turned down the request. But Chen Xin indicated that the trade unions would definitely make known their stand on this matter. SCHFEU subsequently issued a 5-paragraph statement, tactfully expressing the trade unions' disagreement with the decision of BSS leaders to give way to Lee Siew Choh. (See SCHEFEU's Bulletin of 28 February 1965) [Note 6].
The CPM adopted a comprehensive strategy of withdrawing cadres to beat a retreat from Singapore and some other incorrect policies. As a result, CPM could not have an effective influence on the lawful organisations and the masses in Singapore. They had no choice but to arrange for Lee Siew Choh’s return to take over the leadership of BSS.
Such unusual decision made by the CPM in coping with the situation in Singapore inevitably gave rise to the following undesirable consequences:
| (1) | There was total negation of Lim Chin Siong's leadership and status in the left-wing movement as well as the strategy of engaging in "constitutional struggle" put forward by Lim Chin Siong; complete negation of the status of the leaders of the left-wing labour movement, and the significance of persisting in the "constitutional struggle" after the departure of Lim Chin Siong from the Singapore political arena; and negation of the autonomy of the labour movement and the right to take the initiatives within the left-wing political movement. |
| (2) | The broad masses and cadres had to accept the idea of left-adventurim adopted by Lee Siew Choh. He was projected as the "supreme leader". Favourable conditions were created for Lee to assume leadership in BSS; and to facilitate his pursuit of the radical "left adventurism". |
The irresistible conclusion to be drawn was that the erroneous decision taken by the leading organisation of the left-wing movement was the decisive internal factor, contributing to the collapse of the left-wing movement. The collapse was consequent upon its being divorced from the masses after embarking on the path of radical left opportunism.
6. Conclusion: The practice of the national democratic movement of the people in Malaya and Singapore has proven that, the strategy of "persisting in the constitutional struggle so long as favourable conditions still exist" is in the interests and aspirations of the people; and to be divorced from the masses and reality is doomed to failure.
At the time of writing this article, a friend of mine detained, imprisoned and deported under the "Operation Coldstore", currently residing in Hong Kong, sent me through someone a Chinese book entitled 《砥柱止中流》 [di-zhu-zhi-zhong-liu, Hong Kong Footprint Press]. The book contained mainly memoirs of some prominent figures involved in the anti-British struggle in the 1950s.
Zhong Hua (锺华), one of the writers, wrote an article "A study of the History of the Singapore People’s Anti-British League". In the article, he said:
"In the past, some, including leftists, regarded the PAP as a 'left-wing party' or 'progressive political party'. In reality, this was 'sheer miscomprehension’. Political figures like Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee as well as the political party PAP under his domination, were well-connected to the British colonialists, since day one of the formation of the party.
Whether they were in the opposition or after seizing political power, they never smacked of being a genuine left-wing or progressive party, as amply illustrated by their word or conduct.
In the final analysis, they were out to make full use of the left-wing forces and leftist elements wielding tremendous influence, as represented by Lim Chin Siong, for the purpose of garnering the support of the broad masses in Singapore, especially the Chinese community."
Before the PAP clique headed by Lee Kuan Yew came into power, and during the early period of the administration since its seizure of power, it never ceased its rivalry with the left-wing forces (mainly in the form of the labour movement) headed by Lim Chin Siong.
In the course of forming PAP, Lee Kuan Yew and his cohorts used their best endeavours to wrest control of the political power in the course of the gradual transfer of power by the British colonial administration.
On the other hand, they were harbouring the evil intention to disintegrate and turn over the lawful organisations of the left-wing forces in Singapore. They were bent on completely eliminating the strong influence wielded by CPM and its underground cells over the left-wing lawful organisations.
In mid-1961, Lim Chin Siong decided to part ways with Lee Kuan Yew. He made a clean break with the PAP and immediately involved himself in the founding of Barisan Sosialis Singapura (BSS).
After the formation of BSS, a large number of organisations managed or run by the populace were absorbed into the party. This constituted a fatal blow to Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP. In the eyes of Lee Kuan Yew, Lim Chin Siong was an excellent political leader posing the most serious threat to PAP since its coming into power.
The rise of BSS could lead to its forming a new government in place of PAP administration. It was therefore a struggle for life and death. For the UMNO leaders in Malaya, they believed that BSS had an upper hand over PAP, and it had popular support. They were worried that the Singapore left-wing organisations would eventually spread their influence to Malaya.
The interaction of these factors caused the PAP ruling clique to resort to the "Operation Coldstore" in 1963 and a series of repressions in later years.
T.N. Harper, the renowned British historian, went through the declassified documents in the British Archives in London. He discovered that Lee Kuan Yew in fact by devious means provoked BSS to resort to extra-legal activities, but Lee falsely claimed that it was his intention to defeat the radical left in open and democratic debates. Despite the provocation, the leftists, on the whole, did not deviate from the path of constitutional struggle (see T.N. Harper's "Lim Chin Siong and the ‘Singapore Story’", Comet in Our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History, 2001, Pg3-55).
Tan Jing Quee, who struggled for democracy to his last breath, also learned from the documents of the British and Australian Archives that, in April 1962, Lee Kuan Yew held discussions on security issues with Sandys, the Colonial Secretary, in London. The Special Branch, at the behest of Tunku, prepared a report. Tunku proposed suppressive actions against the leftists in Singapore to be taken in two phases.
In the first phase, various restrictive measures were to be imposed, such as tightening the control of Chinese newspapers; and prohibiting Singapore non-citizens from holding positions in political parties and trade unions. It was aimed at provoking Lim Chin Siong to resort to unconstitutional actions.
In the second phase, the Special Branch was to send opposition leaders, such as Fong Swee Suan and S. Woodhull, back to Malaya; and "leaders of the United Front below Lim Chin Siong were to be detained".
In the eyes of the British High Commissioner Lord Selkirk, Lee Kuan Yew "is quite clearly attracted by the prospect of wiping out his main political opposition before the next Singapore elections" and he probably "will advocate a policy of provocation on Lim Chin Siong and his associates with a view to forcing them into unconstitutional action justifying their arrests." [See Merger and the Decimation of the Left Wing in Singapore in The Fajar Generation, by Tan Jing Quee, 2010, p.283].
The 2 episodes above may throw light on the reasons why Lim Chin Siong time and again emphasised that "We should persist in constitutional struggle so long as favourable conditions still exist; intensify the work for national unity; forge unity of the people founded on that of workers and peasants".
After taking over the leadership of the left-wing movement from Lim Chin Siong, Lee Siew Choh on his own volition surrendered the constitutional political arena to Lee Kuan Yew and PAP, resulting in the rapid demise of BSS and the total collapse of the left-wing movement.
It has been proven that, the broad masses of the people are not fully aware of the deceptive nature of "parliamentary democracy". They still harboured illusions about "parliamentary democracy".
The left-wing movement must pursue the "constitutional struggle by peaceful means", working towards the unity of the people of all ethnic origins from all walks of life; constantly waging struggles in line with the aspirations and demands of the masses; and striving for national equality and the realization of people's democracy.
"To persist in constitutional struggle so long as favourable conditions still exist" was in the interests and aspirations of the people. Failure to do so would certainly alienate oneself from the masses and realities. The struggle was doomed to failure.
The left-wing movement has made achievements and has committed mistakes. But their mistakes out-weighed their achievements. Mistakes were primary, and serious. Some mistakes could have been avoided. Certain mistakes had been committed as far as more than half a century ago. A review of such issues has yet to be conducted, particularly by the leaders who had gone through those difficult times.
It is high time that serious reviews be conducted about the history of the left-wing movement in Singapore and Malaya before and after 1960s. Some useful lessons ought to be learned. That would serve as an invaluable guide for the struggle in the future.
It is incumbent upon us to conduct thorough reviews of these episodes in our history, since we are from the generation having had personal experiences in them. Leaving such obligations to future generations or historians is tantamount to dereliction of duty on our part.
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| Above is a precious photo provided by the author Chng Min Oh. Chng, working as a painter, was elected executive member of The National Union of Building Construction Workers in 1962. This photo was taken during the inauguration of all Executive Members when Chng signed on a red cloth written with oath using a brush and yellow paint. On the left (person standing) is Yang Xiaohei (namely Yeo Meng Teck), and first right (person sitting and talking to another person behind Chng) is Goh Chong Kwee. Both Yang Xiaohei and Goh Chong Kwee were important leaders of The National Union of Building Construction Workers at that time. |
Original version completed in end of March 2013, revised in early April;
English rendition completed in September 2019
English rendition completed in September 2019
Other related link:
Notation:
［Note 1］Namelist of Central Committee Members of the 10th Singapore Commercial House & Factory Employees' Union (SCHFEU)
［Note 2］Topics covered at "National Unity and Left-Wing Unity" forums organised by SCHFEU were published in the SCHFEU Bulletin accordingly:
［Note 3］Trade Unions Amendment Act
［Note 4］Employment Act
［Note 5］Basis of majority of cadres and masses in the left-wing movement insisted on adhering to the strategy of carrying on with the “constitutional struggle” as expounded by Lim Chin Siong
［Note 6］
［Note 1］Namelist of Central Committee Members of the 10th Singapore Commercial House & Factory Employees' Union (SCHFEU)
| 主席：陈辛 | 副主席：蔡广深 |
| 总务：陈修水 | 副总务：曾田朱、史迪文蔡 |
| 财政：蔡纪成 | 副财政：蔡成隆 |
| 执委：阿末李•敏阿都拉、廖营農、林福成、徐送明、陈必廉、黄亚国、黄日植、庄明湖、陈炳新、杨顺友 | |
| 候补执委：林美兰、李碰狮、周汝观、朱德钦 | |
| 查账：刘成发、陈赞紀 | |
| 信讬：蔡广深、曾田朱、史迪文蔡。 | |
| （此名单刊载于1965年6月1日《厂商工联会讯》第10期，因陈修水担任总务为社团注册官所拒绝，中委会先后委任史迪文蔡、陈必廉为代总务） | |
［Note 2］Topics covered at "National Unity and Left-Wing Unity" forums organised by SCHFEU were published in the SCHFEU Bulletin accordingly:
| 1、 | 魏利煌《左派团结与全民团结》讲词全文 |
| ——刊登在1965年9月17日《厂商工联会讯》第17、18期。 | |
| 2、 | 高棋生《星退出大马后的政治形势，把握矛盾团结全民开展斗争》讲词全文 |
| ——刊登在1965 年10月1日《厂商工联会讯》第18、19期。 | |
| 3、 | 李绍祖《左派团结与统战问题》讲词全文 |
| ——刊登在1965 年10月15日《厂商工联会讯》第 19至21期。 | |
| 4、 | 郑则耀《关於左派团结与当前的迫切任务》讲词全文 |
| ——刊登在1965 年12月1日《厂商工联会讯》第 22、23期。 |
［Note 3］Trade Unions Amendment Act
| 《职工会修正法令》在1965年提出，其反工人内容主要有两部分：（1）剝夺“非公民”“犯刑事罪人士” 担任职工会各级职员的权利。矛头指向左派职工会。 | |
| （2）剝夺工人阶级在维护权益时必要时的“工业行动”权利，和工人阶级在斗争中互相支援的权利。针对所有不同社会信念的职工会，包括没有职工会的工人大众。 | |
| 法令修改后，新条文规定： | |
| • | 第26条及第26条A，这兩条新条文的A项，都提出非公民“皆不能成为职工会及其任何分会的职员，且无资格参加选举以成为这样的职员或成为职工会的受薪职员” 的新规定。其矛头是指向左派职工会。 |
| • | 第26条及第26条B项，规定：任何人士被任何刑事法庭判以背信、勒索、刑事上的恐帐吓罪或任何被部長认为其不適合成为一间职工会的职员（包括受薪职员）的罪行。若部長认为满意被如此定罪的人经已改造，并適合於当任一间职工会的职员，则此段规定不適用。 |
| • | 第24条（A）（1）规定：注册职工会。不能从事、鼓励、组织或支援任何沒有取得大多数会员同意的任何罢工、闭厂或任何形式的工业行动，并必须举行该注册职工会会员的秘密投票耒取得会员同意。 |
| • | 第24条（A）（4）规定：“工业行动”一词的释义扩大：凡任何旨在妨碍、阻撓、限制或减少任何业务服务、交易、工业或商业，包括工作的执行或一项限制实习、程序或方法的采用的任何行动，而其后果是造成产量或生产受限制、或者造成一种限制或制止生产量或生产趋势。 |
| （取材自全星卅左派工团联合声明:《暴露职工会修正法案》刊载于1966年1月8日《阵线报》第160期） | |
［Note 4］Employment Act
| 1968年5月26日，李光耀政权在“国会”提出《僱佣法案》，美其名以取代1955年的《劳工法令》、1957年的《书记僱佣法令》、1957年的《店员僱佣法令》，并在同年8月间所谓“辩论修正”三读通过，正式成为《僱佣法令》强行实施。这是李光耀政权明目张胆维护外资利益，高度欺压工人大众的另一部亲外资反工人“法令”。当年，左派工会形容它是对工人阶级“剥皮抽筋，敲骨吸髓”的“吃人法令”，遭受广大工人大众强烈反对。 | |
| 《僱佣法令》侵犯工人阶级权益的主要条文是： | |
| 1. | 关於劳工部的权力：凡劳资纠纷、僱佣、赔赏、年假、超时工作等方面，劳工部拥有最后决定权力。若违反其决定，将被当“犯法论”处治。 |
| ——剥夺工人通过工业行动争取合理权益的权利。 | |
| 2. | 关於解僱工人：不是在同一僱主连续工作三年者，将得不到分文解僱金。僱主可以工人“行为不良”、“生产不积极”等等暂停工人工作或解僱。工人旷工两天将受解僱遭遇。工人一时疏忽造成货物损坏或损失，将被强迫赔赏。 |
| ——工人的工作毫无保障。 | |
| 3. | 关於工作时数与公假：书记工人工作时数，从每周39小时增至44小时，公共假期由15天減至11天，年假被裁減一半。 |
| ——旨在加强工人的劳动强度。 | |
| （取材自《阵线报》1968年第282、283、284、292期） | |
［Note 5］Basis of majority of cadres and masses in the left-wing movement insisted on adhering to the strategy of carrying on with the “constitutional struggle” as expounded by Lim Chin Siong
| 当时全星30间左派工团组成的联络秘书处的工运领导，执行、贯彻SATU遵循宪制斗争路线。厂商工联是30工团中拥有万余名会员，并具颇影响力的大工团。 厂商工联在1965-66年度的会务报告中记载，1966年2月厂商工联为庆祝会庆十周年，在国家剧场举办大型文娱会、在中华总商会礼堂举办游园会和出版纪念特刊，在筹备期间动员会内会外近二千人投入工作；一年里处理劳资谈判与劳资纠纷案例110宗。这反映了当时厂商工联在左派工运中的规模与影响力。工业工联拥有会员近三千，胶业工联也拥有会员近二千。其余27工团则欠缺资料统计。保守估计，30工团共有会员近三万。是一股战斗力强群众基础稳固，坚守SATU宪制斗争路线的力量。 1965年8月9日，30工团遵循SATU四项斗争纲领原则，立场一致联合发表 “争取新加坡主权完整独立” 政策声明。 尽管当年工团遭遇李绍祖掌控社阵领导及其追随党团的打击、破坏与分裂，至1966年年中，仍有23间工团坚持SATU遵循宪制斗争路线，1966年23工团遵循宪制斗争指导原则“依法行事”在羽球馆联合举行庆祝国际劳动节大会，即是标志性的说明。值得一提的是，厂商工联、工业工联、胶业工联，这三间会员众多的工团均是庆祝国际劳动节筹委会筹委单位。 |
［Note 6］
| 厂商工联在1965年2月28日出版的第四期《厂商工联会讯》上，发表《关于左派运动团结问题》声明，简要表达工会的五点意见，婉转表达了不苟同社阵领导向李绍祖屈服的立场和态度。以下是声明全文： 1、对於本邦左派运动内部过去所出现的意见分歧和公开决裂，我们是深感遗憾的。但是我们始终坚信分歧和决裂，是可以在团结的原则下获得解决的；它所带来的暂时困难，是可以克服的。左派运动内部的伟大团结，是历史的千秋大业，暂时的分歧和决裂，絲毫不能阻止左派运动大团结这一伟大日子的到来。 2、广大人民，对於本邦左派运动内部团结，寄以殷切的厚望。作为左派运动的一员，我们始终不敢辜负这个殷切的厚望。我们衷心地期望，左派运动克服暂时的分歧和决裂，恢复团结。我们总是诚诚恳恳地欢迎一切有利于左派运动团结的言论和作法。 3、在艰苦复杂的斗争局面下，本邦左派运动内部，曾经出现过“悲观消极，不敢斗争”和“盲目冒进，不善斗争”两种不良倾向，严重地影响着左派运动的团结和斗争路线。我们认为，克服这两种不良倾向任务，是贯穿着整个时期的。现在，左派运动传统性唯一正确的“敢于斗争，善于斗争”的路线已被确立和坚持，克服两种不良倾向的工作也取得了一定的成绩，特别是“不敢斗争”的倾向，在很大程度上，已被克服。但是，进一步的努力，仍然有需要。 4、左派工运在斗争过程中的主动性和独立性问题，是一个重要的原则问题，它关系到左派运动的成败，关系到左派运动的伟大历史任务和斗争目标的实现。左派工运的主动性和独立性，不应该，也不能够被轻率地否定和忽视。 5、左派运动目前所存在的意见分歧，是左派运动的内部矛盾问题，因此，这是完全可以在平等协商，互相尊重的基础上，通过摆事实，讲道理的方法获得解决的。 |
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